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## **SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DEMOCRACY**

### **Introduction**

The aim of this article is to present a feed-back appeared between democracy and social capital, which is represent by such designates like trust, loyalty, reliability, mutually norms, skill and readiness to cooperation, civil righteousness<sup>1</sup>. Taking such an issue is caused by two reasons. Firstly, it is worth noticing that both those terms are connected with institutional stream due to the fact that they both can be defined as a „net of game rules between actors which fulfill different social roles by using formal and informal norms<sup>2</sup> connected f. e. with proper behaviour when making a contract and giving by a principal the authorization to the agent<sup>3</sup>”. The importance of such matter results from the fact that without proper institutional environment economic stimulus does not provide to the optimal allocation of resources. As A. Matysiak rightly notices, the more institutions in society, the bigger possibility to management<sup>4</sup>. What is more, this author suggests, that without the institutions it would not be possible to keep the spontaneous order so called the mechanism of invisible hand. Institutions force human beings not to forget about others while making an own interest. Moreover, thanks to them one can better foresee the resultants of action. In different words, institutions help to

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<sup>1</sup> See: J. S. Coleman, *Foundation of Social Theory*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1990, F. Fukuyama, *Zaufanie. Kapitał społeczny a droga do dobrobytu*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1999, R. Putnam, *Demokracja w działaniu. Tradycje obywatelskie we współczesnych Włoszech*, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 1995.

<sup>2</sup> The first element belongs to a group of formal institutions, which are also called hard regulators of social-economic life. Social capital represents informal institutions. See: H. Dziarska, *Delikatne zestrojenie*. Interview with K. Kostro from Instytut Nauk Ekonomicznych PAN. dated 12.03.2004r, [www.polskieradio.pl](http://www.polskieradio.pl).

<sup>3</sup> J. K. Solarz, *Bankowość międzynarodowa. Analiza instytucjonalna*, Biblioteka Menedżera i Bankowca, Warszawa 2004, s.21.

<sup>4</sup> A. Matysiak, *Źródła kapitału społecznego*, Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej im. O. Langego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 1999, s. 96.

reduce uncertainty<sup>5</sup>. Secondly, the attempt to present the relation between such institutions is caused due to the present-day crisis of democracy, which is not only a consequence of inadequate structures or weakness of representation, which exhibits under populist pressure or oligarchic distortion. Its source is also found in the loss of ethic parameters. The democratic environment looks more like being dominated by many kinds of permissivism, which promotes ethos of individualism. Such situation pulls human beings to make decisions free from responsibility and commitment to society which is noticed when observing politician's action. I agree with R. Dahrendorf who says that „for democracy there is no bigger threat than indifference and passivity of citizens”<sup>6</sup>. In this way it's seems that appealing to social capital concept could be a remedy for such a situation. What is more, social capital is identified with a binder which combines the institutions in such a way that they can work together<sup>7</sup>. Building and developing of its positive form leads to reduce uncertainty and to reduce the transaction costs. Moreover, social capital influences the improving of the quality of life and the growth of welfare. All those reflections give right for thoughts in next paragraphs where the interaction of institutions included in the theme is showed.

### 1. The meaning of democracy

One can find many definitions of democracy, but one created by J. A. Schumpeter is seemed to be worth underlining. This author says, that democracy is a „way of making political decisions which point is that one comes to power by competitive rivalry for people's votes”<sup>8</sup>. One can notice that in a similar way L. Balcerowicz defines democracy. He claims, that it is „a system, in which authorities are chosen and changed by all citizens in regular and authentic election”<sup>9</sup>. In this way we can conclude that democracy is a collection of convictions which main value is the possibility of human being to show its freedom of expressing the

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<sup>5</sup> Ibidem, s. 91.

<sup>6</sup> R. Dahrendorf, *Zagrożone społeczeństwo obywatelskie*, in: *Europa i społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Rozmowy w Castel Gandolfo*, ed. K. Michalski, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 1994, s. 6.

<sup>7</sup> H. Dziarska, *Delikatne zestrojenie*, op.cit.

<sup>8</sup> J. A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Harper and Bros., New York 1942, s. 269.

<sup>9</sup> L. Balcerowicz, *Wolność i rozwój. Ekonomia wolnego rynku*, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 1998, s. 14.

point of view – even if it is not popular at the moment. Moreover, citizens get the freedom of association and the freedom of sharing their points of view. The receiver of these prime values can be all aspects of social, cultural and economic life. As rightly warn M. and R. Friedman, restriction of freedom in one aspect of life, will lead to reduce its level in others<sup>10</sup>. By present-day criteria the country is considered to be strictly democratic when it is based formally and really on “accessibility of political spheres without restraint due to class, racial, material or religious matters and on possibility to choose representatives on political stage and free access to them”<sup>11</sup>. It is easy to notice, that the showed freedom is understood not only as a freedom to sth (so-called positive freedom), but also as a freedom from sth (negative freedom). That’s the point that there is also a situation when human being is able to manifest its freedom from discrimination. Only free people who experience the freedom of thoughts, words and association can create social and economic relations based on designates of social capital. Freedom influences the growth of social capital. It’s beyond all doubt, that freedom of human being (freedom of thoughts and association) is the most important in all theories which explain the function of democracy. This assumption due to its importance is an inseparable component of the theory. Following Lakatos, freedom of human being is a “hard core” of theory<sup>12</sup>. In such context positive and negative freedom can be treated as an inseparable feature of democracy.

As K. Popper rightly notices, democracy should not be identified with such imprecise definitions like “power of people” or “power of majority”. Democracy is a collection of such institutions (mostly elections and people’s right to expel the government), which allow society to control and expel political representatives and – what is more – they enable them to carry out reforms by peaceful means even against the will of those politicians. Such possibility does not lead to collapse of social capital but even leads to its creation<sup>13</sup>. In another way, the usage of force may

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<sup>10</sup> M. Friedman, R. Friedman, *Wolny wybór*, Wydawnictwo Aspekt, Sosnowiec 2006, s.2. In a similar way thinks L. Balcerowicz. See: L. Balcerowicz, *Państwo w przebudowie*, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 1999, s. 41.

<sup>11</sup> See: M. Gulczyński: *Nauka o polityce*, Wydawnictwo Druktur, Warszawa 2007.

<sup>12</sup> I. Lakatos, *Falsyfication and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*, after: A. Chalmers, *Czym jest to co zwiemy nauką?*, Wydawnictwo Siedmiogród, Wrocław 1997, s. 111.

<sup>13</sup> K. Popper, *Spoleczeństwo otwarte i jego wrogowie*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2000, t. II, s. 191.

be only justified when tyranny makes impossible to carry out reforms and when the aim of using force is to do that. Present tyranny may only lead to destruction of social capital, but trust and reliability, civil righteousness are prime to maintain democracy. As K. Popper says, there is only one situation which justifies using of force in a political strife. He means such a situation, when the resistance is put up by present democracy against all attacks (it does not matter if they are from inside or outside the country) directed to democratic constitutions and democratic governing rules. Than all loyal citizens should repel an attack even by using the force, especially when the attack is from the government or when a government tolerates such an attack<sup>14</sup>. The researcher claims, that „in the reality the function of democracy is depended to some degree on understanding that the government which intends to abuse its power and transforms into tyranny (or which tolerates the situation when somebody else becomes a tyrant) puts itself out of law and that citizens have not only the right, but also the duty to identify its action with crime and its memberships with a group of criminals [...] There should be no doubt, that the only aim of such resistance is to rescue democracy. Using such situation for carrying out contra tyranny is a crime like a trial of carrying out tyranny”<sup>15</sup>. Using such a threat even when its aim is to rescue democracy by frightening its opponents, is a bad method of defending democratic rules. Such a threat causes a commotion in democracy and „in situation of danger it is easy to help enemy”<sup>16</sup>. All tyranny should be fought because it declines and destroys created level of designates of social capital to public institutions and even contributes to create negative form of it<sup>17</sup>. It turned out that democratic countries are not free from failures, but it is commonly known that democracy is a big achievement of well understood social engineering<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> Ibidem, s. 192.

<sup>15</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>17</sup> As a negative social capital are acknowledged f.e. mafia or nepotism. See: K.W. Frieske, *Utopie inkluzji. Sukcesy i porażki programów reintegracji społecznej*, Wydawnictwo IPiSS, Warszawa 2004, s. 68.

<sup>18</sup> K. Popper, op.cit., t I, s. 145. In his book K. Popper claims, that social engineering assumed, that a person is a responsible for its life and its aims determine history and it can change it. What is more, a human being does not believe that aims are imposed by historical background or history trends, because he considers them as an object of free choice or even as something that was created by ourselves. See more: K. Popper, op.cit., t I, s. 31.

## 2. Democracy which determines social capital

Often researchers emphasize that democracy determines to the highest degree the creation of social capital and in particular is responsible for creation of such designates of social capital like trust, loyalty, reliability or civil righteousness. Simultaneously if this system should work right it needs citizen's trust. I admit such thesis after f. e. Ch. Tilly who notices that „some level of trust is necessary for democracy”<sup>19</sup>. In another way, trust is a factor which strengthens democracy. What is more, democracy creates the above mentioned designate of social capital<sup>20</sup>. It is beyond all questions that democratic structure on which modern countries are based on, will not be stable, if its basis and center will no more be based on human beings and values in which they believe<sup>21</sup>. In this context, let's see the observed feed-back starting with the situation when democracy creates conditions for building social capital.

As P. Sztompka suggests, it is more possible that the culture of trust will be created under democracy rather than in other political system<sup>22</sup>. In his opinion the reliability of democracy is based on two kinds of mechanism, that is extortion from responsibility and on self-restriction of action. First of all, this institution gives a full context of responsibility. The author makes reference to G. Parry's statement that „rulers produce most trust when we can count on that fact that the right regime will force them to fulfill expectations connected with them. [...] There is still no obstacle to trust our rulers, but only in consequence with the trust to political mechanism”<sup>23</sup>. What is more, G. Parry underlines that under democracy people rely more on political, and constitutional mechanisms which extort responsibility rather on rulers than on morals<sup>24</sup>. As K. Popper claims, democracy protects from abusing power, because it gives the society the right to judge their government and to take away the political power. What is more, for using political and economic power by the gov-

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<sup>19</sup> Ch. Tilly, *Trust and Rule*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, s. 104 .

<sup>20</sup> A. Matysiak, op.cit., s. 116.

<sup>21</sup> E. Balawejder, *Demokracja w systemie wartości*, in: *Spółeczeństwo otwarte*, ed. E. Balawejder, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2007, s. 72.

<sup>22</sup> The researcher assumes simultaneously capsule of ceteris paribus. See: P. Sztompka, *Zaufanie. Fundament społeczeństwa*, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2007, s.344.

<sup>23</sup> P. Sztompka, op.cit., s. 344 after: G. Parry, *Trust, distrust and consensus*, British Journal of Political Science, t. 6, No. 2/1976, s. 139.

<sup>24</sup> G. Parry, op.cit., s.141.

ernment to realize the aims different from protecting society's freedom<sup>25</sup>. In another way, although democracy protects from abusing, it does not give the guarantee that the power will be wisely used<sup>26</sup>.

What is more, the institution of democracy by focusing its attention on precision and stable constitution contributes to putting in motion the mechanism of self-restriction of action. Constitutionalism is a guarantee of continuity of political system, because it gives the basis for restrain the possibility of changing the elementary rights<sup>27</sup>. Hardin notices that „institutionalization of power and realization of consequent politics should lead to bigger stability of expectations, and to larger trust”<sup>28</sup>.

As P. Sztompka rightly notices, these two mechanisms mentioned mean the existence of a paradox. The pressure on extortion from responsibility and on self-restriction of action shows that under democracy trust appears by institutionalization of distrust. This researcher cites after Barber that „democratic country needs giving grounds for criticism which the results of attachment to democracy; in this context some level of distrust has a big meaning for life of democratic order”<sup>29</sup>. Institutionalization of distrust, which is in most democratic rules, means some protection for those people, who are willing to risk trust and also discourages those, who want to abuse trust. It corrects such situations, in which the trust had been yet broken. P. Sztompka claims, that the first paradox of democracy is that „the more institutionalized distrust, the more there will be spontaneous trust”<sup>30</sup>. The researcher gives an example of few basic democratic rules, which institutionalize distrust.

The first important one is the rule of legitimization. Such state is a consequence of the fact that an elementary assumption of democracy is some level of suspicion to all power. This institution requires justification towards all powers, which oneselves are admitted as suspected<sup>31</sup>. Only

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<sup>25</sup> K. Popper, op.cit., t. II, s. 160.

<sup>26</sup> S. I. Benn, R.S. Peters, *Social Principles and the Democratic State*, Allen & Unwin, London 1977, s. 351.

<sup>27</sup> P. Sztompka, op.cit., s. 344.

<sup>28</sup> R. Hardin, *Trusting persons, trusting institutions*, w: *Strategy and Choice*, ed. R.J. Zeckhauser, MIT Press, Cambridge 1991, s. 204.

<sup>29</sup> B. Barber, *The Logic and Limits of Trust*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey 1983, s. 81 in: P. Sztompka, op.cit., s. 345.

<sup>30</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>31</sup> S. Holmes, *Tocqueville and democracy*, in: *The Idea of Democracy*, ed. D. Copp and others, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993, s. 24.

when it turns out that the source of power is a will of all citizens shown during the elections and when the chosen representatives realize the interests of majority, the government is admitted as legal. But it does not suggest the situation when the institutionalized distrust disappears. The majority gives it to changes, to „unstable collection, which members, motives and interests change from day to day and which care about human being’s interest which may be weak as by despot”<sup>32</sup>. It may happen a situation when chosen representatives do not realize their election promises given to their electors. Because of that democracy allows the existence of citizen’s disobedience institutions or the possibility to dismiss the chosen representatives, which are suspected of abusing trust. As K. Popper claims, the improvement of such institutions depends on ourselves because democratic institutions can not improve themselves and a matter of their correction is a problem rather for people than institutions. What is more, „if we want to repair, we have to realize which institutions we want to change”<sup>33</sup>. Parry notices that „when the legislative and administrative authority offends social trust, it may be saddled with the responsibility”<sup>34</sup>.

The second elementary rule is a periodicity and term of office. Some level of distrust to elect is expressed through them. Simultaneously it is assumed that they will be able to accept period control of their actions. It is assumed here that those people will not put up a resistance to resignation from privileges they have. What is important, it is also assumed that possible propensity to put up a resistance will be declined due to institutionalized mechanism of changing power<sup>35</sup>. Hardin declines that „rational substantiation of trust to clerks [...] requires that they will be more sensitive to social needs and desires. They might be encouraged to do that by putting on them some responsibility and the most convincing way which leads to probable election rivalry”<sup>36</sup>. It is worth here saying that the existence of opposite groups towards chosen authority is like continuous and critical way of monitoring of exercising power by this group. It is also an element which may discourage the abusing of power.

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<sup>32</sup> S. I. Benn, R. S. Peters, *op.cit.*, s. 323.

<sup>33</sup> K. Popper, *op.cit.*, t I, s. 160-161.

<sup>34</sup> G. Parry, *op. cit.*, s. 131.

<sup>35</sup> P. Sztompka, *op.cit.*, s. 346.

<sup>36</sup> R. Hardin, *op.cit.*, s. 204.

Democracy is also characterized by the division of power. This rule sets up the existence of a mechanism which guarantees the keeping of the political balance and limitation of competences of proper institutions. We can notice here a suspicion to the growing of institutions and to monopolization of decisions and to abusing of the power. Because of such reasons in open and legally way the mechanism of both control is built by the function of such institutions. But the effectiveness of such mechanisms is determined by both: independence between legislative, executive, law power and “the fourth power” – media.

What is more, constitutionalism and checking acts under constitution, are next – no less important – rules which are valid in a democratic country and which allows to create trust. It can be understood as a result of distrust to honesty of legislative institutions, which may abuse their functions to create or break law and in this way to realize their own interests and to get advantages from that<sup>37</sup>. What is more, representatives chosen in a democratic way may get profits from supporting political action which favor some group of interests at the cost of whole society. Because egoistic profits of members of such groups are large, so they feel strong will to make relations and to inform deputies about how much they are interested in some matters. Votes of many members of such group and financial support will be then dependent on points of view of a politician for some matters, which are highly important for the group of interests. Because such cases are not specially important for the society, citizens will not go into details and will neglect them. A politician operating alone can not do much for supporting the interests of unaware majority. But when he will support the actions of the groups of interests, he can then get adherents, workers to political campaign and what is important will also get money for this. These days when politics is created by media, politicians are encouraged to support the group of interests to get money for political campaign. Such funds can be also used for creating positive image. Politicians who are not willing to take part in such a game and who are not going to abuse social capital of majority are in worse situation. As Gwartney and Stroup claim „it is seemed that some invisible hand led the politicians letting them to reflect views of group of interests, even if it leads to waste of money”<sup>38</sup>. Due to that there

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<sup>37</sup> P. Sztompka, op.cit., s. 348.

<sup>38</sup> J. Gwartney, R. Stroup, *Co każdy powinien wiedzieć o gospodarce*, Centrum im. Adama Smitha, Warszawa 1994, s. 88.

should be some “elementary rights” which “will stand above all detailed regulations” and which would be hard to change and which in some degree would limit the changes in the future<sup>39</sup>. Institutions which are on guard of constitution are usually supreme courts and constitutive tribunals.

Democracy gives a possibility to mass-engagement and activism of citizens by voluntarily associations, social organizations and local government. Self-government serves as antidote against bureaucracy, selfish government and administrative aparat. Citizens, which create groups are responsible for controlling and putting pressure on public authorities. It is a consequence of distrust towards country and administration<sup>40</sup>. The creating of civil society could protect country from changing in authoritative or even totalitarian<sup>41</sup>. Other groups, which are developing it selves in democracy are for example organizations protecting one customers rights, trade union, groups of interests. Due to them, we can see the distrust, but in this case it's to government's and public authorities skills to look after many kinds of social group's interests<sup>42</sup>. Two more mechanisms are here noticed, which increase social capital. The first mechanism describes what human being can count on in association's net and secondly what increases individual capital and gives bigger sense of security. In other way, it increases readiness for showing social capital. What is more, giving part of the government's authority to local authorities means that to some degree it trusts their citizens. In this situation some feeling of obligation increase trust to the government.

We should notice at the end that described rules are idealistic and they are helpful to reconstruct standard model of democracy. Establishing of them is necessary for institutionalization of distrust and creating social capital. Those rules refer to so-called „democracy in regulations<sup>43</sup>”, where there is no place for any failures. However in reality it is necessary to indicate correction of mechanisms which will counteract the erosion of social capital. As P. Sztompka maintains “probably there is no

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<sup>39</sup> P. Sztompka, op.cit., s. 348 after: A. Przeworski and others., *Sustainable Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, s. 50.

<sup>40</sup> P. Sztompka, op.cit., s. 349.

<sup>41</sup> Z. Krasnodębski, *Spoleczeństwo obywatelskie i jego przyjaciele*, www.nowe-panstwo.pl.

<sup>42</sup> S.I. Benn, R. S. Peters, op.cit., s. 281.

<sup>43</sup> Distinction for „democracy in regulations” and „democracy in action” is made by P. Sztompka. See: P. Sztompka, op.cit., s. 351.

more danger for undermining trust and spreading out cynicism than cases of offending and using democratic rules”<sup>44</sup>. Therefore the so-called “democracy in run” forces to use mentioned correction mechanisms as a contingency plan. What is more, it comes out that sickness of democracy may be more destructive for the trust of culture than autorative regime. When this sickness is commonly noticed, trust changes in common distrust. If democratic rules are abused in invisible way and people still believe in democracy, then their trust becomes to be blind and naïve. Moreover, disclosure of truth about breaking the rules will lead to destruction of social capital. That is why it is necessary to use correction mechanisms. It is worth stressing that when those mechanisms will be used sporadically, then the culture of trust is stable. In other way, their overactivity testify for its falling down. What is more, trust will be common if it is not only an effect of good working correction mechanisms because institutionalization of trust must create invisible protection frame for spontaneous action based on social capital<sup>45</sup>

### **3. Social capital which influences democracy**

As it was mentioned, there is a feed-back between social capital and democracy. Not only democracy create this capital, but also this designate of social capital is an indispensable condition to maintain democracy. Cladis notices few elementary rules for democracy which existing is determined by some level of social capital<sup>46</sup>.

It is underlined that flow of information between citizens determines proper work of democracy<sup>47</sup>. Freedom of conviction, statements expressing an opinion regardless of the fact if they are compatible or opposite to those, which are declared by authority is a basic criteria, which distinguishes democracy from other political systems. We should remind that this kind of freedom was earlier recognized as a “hard core” of democracy theory. In this case trust, loyalty, reliability will foster establishing relationships between people and communication between them. Due to social capital human beings feel less hampered and they start to be

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<sup>44</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>45</sup> P. Sztompka calls such a situation the second paradox of democracy. See: P. Sztompka, op.cit., s. 354.

<sup>46</sup> M.S. Cladis, *A Communitaria Defense of Liberalism: Emile Durkheim and Contemporary Social Theory*, Stanford University Press, Stanford Calif. 1992, s. 213.

<sup>47</sup> P. Sztompka, op.cit., s. 355.

more spontaneous in the interactions. Parry underlines that “necessary for poliarchi communication works better when people trust each other”<sup>48</sup>. What is more, P. Sztompka stresses, that social capital is a basis to maintain the fact that partners are sincere and serious in situation when they shape their opinions<sup>49</sup>.

It is not difficult to notice, that the flow of information forces create tolerance. It means a situation when all differences, opinions and preferences are accepted. Existing designates of social capital give us then the feeling of security and certainty, which allows to identify the existing differences with new possibilities and not with coming threat<sup>50</sup>. It is worth adding after K. Popper that unlimited tolerance leads to decay of tolerance, „if we widen unlimited tolerance even on those who are not tolerant, if we are not prepared for defending tolerant society against the attack of intolerant people, then the tolerant and tolerance will be destroyed”<sup>51</sup>. K. Popper does not mean continuous suppressing of voices and views of intolerant people, but he notices that „we have to demand the right to suppress them if it is necessary even by using the force; because it may easily turn out that they are not ready to meet the using of rational evidences, but they start by denouncing all arguments; they may prohibit their adherents to hear rational arguments, because they are delusive and teach them to answer by using fist or gun [...] we have to identify encouraging to intolerance and oppression as a crime like murder, kidnapping or slaves trade”<sup>52</sup>. In other words, democracy should not be identified with tolerance of aggression, corruption or dictatorship. The existence of these causes automatically objection of society.

The basic mechanisms in shaping politics and making decisions under democracy are compromise and consensus. Conflict and fight are rejected. It is beyond all doubt, that mechanisms showed here take place, when the partners accept prevalent rules. Moreover, „they find a basis when they can find solution accepted by both sides”<sup>53</sup>. Social capital enables here the assumption of rightness and others’ good will.

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<sup>48</sup> G. Parry, *op.cit.*, s. 129.

<sup>49</sup> P. Sztompka, *op.cit.*, s. 355.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>51</sup> K. Popper such a situation call as „paradox of tolerance”. See more: K. Popper, *op.cit.*, t. I, s. 340.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>53</sup> P. Sztompka, *op.cit.*, s. 355.

It is also worth noticing, that democracy requires some standard of culture in public debate<sup>54</sup>. That's the point like staying by the subject or respecting the dignity of an opponent. Parry underlines that „the feeling of trust prevents from changing public debate in open hostility”<sup>55</sup>. It comes from the fact that mutual trust is here necessary. What is more, also the issue of the meaning of words is especially important in case of people chosen by the majority to represent them and to exercise power. It is obvious that every authority uses a language, in some special way, they use the words and stylistic model of their own. It is important to observe if the so-called public language used by the authority is treated as a its property, which belongs to them ex officio or as a common good shared with those to whom it is concerns. It is common that chosen representatives progress in a way as they could exclusively use the words and freely create their meaning. Other words, in such situations we have here, as M. Glowinski says „an advanced semantic freedom”. Consequently, the language, which is used by the authority becomes a language filled by fight or a language with multiplied aggression. What is more, “a person who do not agree with our ideas, is not on the other side or is not our enemy, but is also a continuous conspirator”<sup>56</sup>. Such language destroys trust or reliability to our representatives. It is also not identical with showing the respect to people who have different point of view. It can become a basis of social revolt or even destroying the basis of democracy, which in large measure, is based on freedom of word, views and tolerance. Then the precision of meaning becomes not very important and arbitral valued signs are imposed to the society<sup>57</sup>.

It is not difficult to notice, that it is impossible to talk about democracy excluding the participation of human beings in public life. In democracy active citizens are able to devoted to taking part in democratic institutions, associations or other forms typical of citizen society. Participation as a tool for generating, cumulating and articulating common values and social interests, requires some level of designates of social capital to reigned system<sup>58</sup>. It also requires at least minimal level of trust to

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<sup>54</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>55</sup> G. Parry, op.cit., s. 129.

<sup>56</sup> M. Głowiński, *Dramat języka. Uwagi o mowie publicznej IV RP*, Przegląd Polityczny, No. 78/2006, s. 28.

<sup>57</sup> Ibidem, s. 30.

<sup>58</sup> P. Sztompka, op.cit., s. 356.

other citizens (so called horizontal trust<sup>59</sup>), because “people must trust each other, if they want to cooperate to achieve those aims, which they are not able to attain only by individual action”<sup>60</sup>.

It is also worth stressing after P. Sztompka, that democracy needs well-educated citizens. Active and effective participation of human beings in social and economic life seen f. e. in taking part in election requires considerable information, knowledge, possibility of estimation and perceiving. Being a competent citizen forces the existence of trust to information sources and the knowledge of politics. The researcher claims, that the society should trust in authenticity of relaying the news or reliability of media. Also reliably prepared statistic data or true information about candidates taking office in public institutions determinate the creating of social capital, which is the basis for maintaining democracy in a country<sup>61</sup>.

To sum up, social capital is necessary to maintain the democracy. Without its designate it is impossible to build relations between people and to share reliable information. It is also impossible to associate and take an active part in social life. What is more, also the choice of representatives to democratic public institutions is dependent on the existence of this designate of social capital. It comes from it that democracy should be created in support of vertical and horizontal social capital.

## Conclusions

Inseparable elementary feature of democracy is freedom of the speech and the possibility of association. Individuals equipped in positive and negative freedom are able to create not only economic, but also social and political relationships. But the stability of them is in large measure dependent on social capital. High level of its institutions, f. e. trust or reliability will foster the reduction of uncertainty and distrust between people. Active participation in social life, choice of representatives to democratic public institutions are dependent on level both of vertical and horizontal social capital.

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<sup>59</sup> Vertical social capital exists between government and citizens. See: P. Sztompka, *op.cit.*, s. 256.

<sup>60</sup> G. Parry, *op. cit.*, s. 29.

<sup>61</sup> P. Szompka, *op.cit.*, s. 256.

Moreover, democracy is acknowledged by many researchers as this kind of system, which in the highest degree is responsible for creating social capital. The main democratic rules due to institutionalization of uncertainty, contribute to build trust. What is more, democratic system is effective when it guarantees the economic, political and social stability. There is no doubt that this stability will exist, if the democratic institutions are able to create designates of social capital. In that case we can clearly notice the attendance of feed-back between democracy and social capital. The feed-back, which decides on success of modern civil society.

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